New Hybrid Features for Phish Website Prediction

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Abstract

Phishing is a serious threat to the web economy and
the Internet communication, because phishers put both users
and organizations at risk of identity theft and financial
losses. Phishers continually exploit new sophisticated
features to impersonate legitimate web pages, modify their
components and host their phishes. Furthermore, the prediction
susceptibilities of features that were previously investigated
become a key challenge for discriminating the evolving phishes.
Accordingly, this paper investigated the prediction susceptibility
of 58 hybrid features. It was observed that the investigated
features were highly exploited in the content and hosted the
URLs of phish webpages. The prediction susceptibility of the
proposed features was experimentally examined in the
suspected webpages using the SVM machine learning
classification technique. The results revealed that the
introduced features could be considered as potentially
predictive ones and they could be utilized in the upcoming
research to improve phishing detection approaches.

Keywords: Hybrid features, Phishing, Prediction Susceptibility.
1 Introduction

In the last decade, cyberspace has shown a rapid expansion of phishing. Phishers try to target users and enterprises to access their sensitive information. They imitate legitimate websites with some deceptive features to build their phishes [1-3]. Moreover, they continually evolve phishes by exploiting more sophisticated features in different feature spaces, such as webpage URLs and content. Thus, they can circumvent the existing phish detect approaches, causing more potential risks and monetary losses [4, 5]. Most of the literature focus on methods of surviving phish attacks, hosted in webpages and the ways to improve the existing phishing detective approaches, such as the list-based, heuristics, hybrid and information flow-based methods [1, 2, 6, 7]. The hybrid detective approaches somewhat outperform other approaches due to the use of classifiers and multiple types of features, i.e. hybrid features. However, in the course of this approach, some related issues have emerged, such as the evolutionary phishing features, so that the recently deployed ones are not effective in handling them. This, in turn, has degraded the performance of the detective phising approach against the rapid growth and distribution of phish webpages over the Web [3, 6, and 7]. As such, exploring more predictive features continually will help improve effective phishing detection. For this purpose, this study sought for newly exploited features by the phishers and experimentally investigated them in terms of the phishing prediction susceptibility.

Thus, by examining 58 hybrid features from the webpage URL and content, the webpage URLs were extracted and investigated through certain computational strategies, such as the features selection and classification. The scope of this work is limited to the experimental investigation of numerous new features for phishing detection. The computational strategies related to the features selection and machine learning classification were kept constant, but they can be improved for the recommended features in the future research. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a background of the previously proposed features and detective strategies in the context of existing related studies. Section 3 presents the newly introduced hybrid features. In Section 4, the assessment strategy and experiments are explained. Section 5 discusses the results in the context of the experiments. Finally, conclusions and future implications are presented in Section 6 to give insight on the obtained results.

2 Related Works

Various phishing detective approaches have been proposed by researchers in the recent years to mitigate the increased phishing susceptibility. In general, these approaches can be classified into white lists of famous trustworthy URLs, black lists of valid phish URLs, heuristics and rule-based approaches, information flow and hybrid approaches. However, most of them have several shortcomings in
leveraging features that are continually exploited by the phishers. Table 1 summarizes the previously deployed features for phishing detection and characterizes them into the webpage content features, the URL features and the online features or third party features based on their nature and the webpage parts [8, 9, and 28]. These features are varied in their prediction susceptibility to phishing so that each feature may have negative or positive effects on the performance of phishing detective approach.

Evolving phish webpages contain various hybrid features; some of which were rarely considered and defined by the previous works. Today, phishers exploit deceptive features in target webpages to hide some links for users’ redirection to their own fake webpages. Moreover, they obfuscate the client-side scripting components, such as JavaScript, PHP and ASP. Moreover, they modify some applets, Flash objects and ActiveX controls in the source file of their targets to submit their cookies and fake advertisements through the web banners. They also target the URLs of webpages presented in any language rather than English, e.g. Chinese e-business webpages. Such deceptive features enable phishers to install suspicious, malicious and spy codes into the client’s computer for further damages and create multiple replicas of their targets for pharming purposes, i.e. redirecting as many visitors as possible to the same fake website. Also, they exploit host URLs of non-English webpages to bypass those phishing detective approaches that have not yet identified them. Today, all these issues are big challenges in mitigating phishing over the web, because the existing phishing detection approaches cannot predict such phishing features [3, 5, 17, 22, 36, 37, 40, 43, and 46].

3 Investigation of Features and Their Prediction Susceptibilities

Based on the aforementioned literature, an experimental strategy was adopted to explore new important deceptive features as shown in Fig. 1. Total of 58 hybrid features were explored manually in this work. In addition, their prediction susceptibility against the above-mentioned phishing deceptions was experimentally investigated. The examined features belong to two different features spaces: the webpage content and the URL. The first feature space contained 48 features that are mostly cross-site scripting and embedded objects.
Table 1: Summarization of the features explored by the literatures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature Space</th>
<th>Feature Type</th>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>URL Features</td>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>IP address, length of hostname length, dots in hostname, dashes in hostname, long hostname, shortened URL, certain characters (“@”, “/”), misspellings and derivation of domain names (paypal1 or paypla), port number, domain’s life, encoded URL (ASCII, Hexa, Oct), Abnormal anchors, RURLs (abnormal request URLs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webpage content</td>
<td>Lexical</td>
<td>Tokens (confirm, banking, secure, ebayispi, webscr, login, signin), HTTP instead of HTTPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brand-name</td>
<td>Names of brands of targeting sites and companies (eBay, Paypal, sulake, facebook, orkut, Santander, mastercard, warcraft, visa, bradesco).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linkage</td>
<td>Coupled In/back links, out links within body text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structure and Source code</td>
<td>Components of DOM tree, title of the webpage, description fields of Meta, tags of HTML document, files of Cascading Style Sheet (CSS), SQL injections, scripts, input, text, password, and hidden fields, Internal and external hyperlinks in <code>&lt;a href=&quot;&quot;&gt;</code>, buttons and their actions, Illegal pop-up windows, unfamiliar English, email functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>WHOIS data (registrant, registration, expiration dates)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visual clues</td>
<td>Images, logos, overall visual layout, styles, blocks, key regions, rendering, flash objects, background color, font family, text alignment, and line spacing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online features</td>
<td>Domain Address</td>
<td>Age and history of Domain. History of URL address, ranking the webpage in search engine results, certificate state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Number of visitors, number of links to the website</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whereas the second feature space contained 10 URL features as presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.

It is highly important to investigate whether or not the explored features can be effective in predicting phishing susceptibility. The examined webpage is signified by the standard document representation that is usually used for text classification. Each examined document \( j \) is represented as a feature vector \( D_j = \{d_{j,1}, \ldots, d_{j,n}\} \), where \( n \) is the number of features, \( d_{j,i} \) indicates the feature itself as a numeric value so that \( 0 \leq d_{j,i} \leq 1 \) [9, 14, 25]. Then, to state the significance of new hybrid features, the given feature matrix \( F \) was trained through the Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier. The SVM classifier is the most commonly used classifier to obtain the optimal separating hyper plane between two classes [6-8, 10, 11, 24, 32, and 33]. It guarantees the lowest level of error rate because of its generalization ability and capacity of handling high dimensional feature space. Furthermore, the SVM classifier produces two output classes \([8,12,32]\), which are represented by the label of +1 and -1 as follows:

\( F \) denotes all the webpages in the dataset, i.e. a multi-dimensional features matrix consisting of a set of feature vectors, so that \( F = \{F_1, F_i, F_{|F|}\} \) and \( F_i \) is the feature vector of each webpage as \( F_i = \{f_{i,1}, f_{i,i}, f_{i,|F_i|}\} \), where \(|F|\) and \(|F_i|\) are the number of feature vectors and features in each feature vector, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td>Number of Scripting.FileSystemObject</td>
<td>F25</td>
<td>JavaScript scripts length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>Number of Excel.Application</td>
<td>F26</td>
<td>Number of functions’ calls in java scripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td>Presence of WScript.shell</td>
<td>F27</td>
<td>Number of script lines in java scripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4</td>
<td>Presence of Adodb.Stream</td>
<td>F28</td>
<td>Script line length in java scripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5</td>
<td>Presence of Microsoft.XMLDOM</td>
<td>F29</td>
<td>Existence of long variable names in java scripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F6</td>
<td>Number of (&lt;embed&gt;)</td>
<td>F30</td>
<td>Existence of long function names in java scripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F7</td>
<td>Number of (&lt;applet&gt;)</td>
<td>F31</td>
<td>Number of fromCharCode()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F8</td>
<td>Number of Word.Application</td>
<td>F32</td>
<td>Number attachEvent()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9</td>
<td>link length in (&lt;embed&gt;)</td>
<td>F33</td>
<td>Number of eval()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F10</td>
<td>Number of (&lt;iframe&gt;)</td>
<td>F34</td>
<td>Number of escap()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F11</td>
<td>Number of (&lt;frame&gt;)</td>
<td>F35</td>
<td>Number of dispatchEvent()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F12</td>
<td>Out-of-place tags</td>
<td>F36</td>
<td>Number of SetTimeout()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F13</td>
<td>Number of (&lt;form&gt;)</td>
<td>F37</td>
<td>Number of exec()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F14</td>
<td>Number (&lt;input&gt;)</td>
<td>F38</td>
<td>Number of pop()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F15</td>
<td>Number of MSXML2.XMLHTTP</td>
<td>F39</td>
<td>Number of replaceNode()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F16</td>
<td>Frequent (&lt;head&gt;, &lt;title&gt;, &lt;body&gt;)</td>
<td>F40</td>
<td>Number of onerror()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F17</td>
<td>(&lt;meta index.php?Sp1=&gt;)</td>
<td>F41</td>
<td>Number of onload()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F18</td>
<td>“Codebase” attribute in (&lt;object&gt;)</td>
<td>F42</td>
<td>Number of onunload()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F19</td>
<td>“Codebase” attribute in (&lt;applet&gt;)</td>
<td>F43</td>
<td>Number of (&lt;script&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F20</td>
<td>“href” attribute of (&lt;link&gt;)</td>
<td>F44</td>
<td>frequent&lt;\div onClick=window.open()’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F21</td>
<td>Number of void links in (&lt;form&gt;)</td>
<td>F45</td>
<td>Number of (&lt;script&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F22</td>
<td>Number of out links</td>
<td>F46</td>
<td>Number of MSXML2.XMLHTTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F23</td>
<td>Number of (&lt;form&gt;) in java scripts</td>
<td>F47</td>
<td>Number of onerror(in javascripts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F24</td>
<td>Number (&lt;input&gt;) in java scripts</td>
<td>F48</td>
<td>Number of SetInterval()</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Then, \( f_{j,i} \) is the value of each \( i^{th} \) feature of \( j^{th} \) feature vector \( F_j \), where \( 0 \leq f_{j,i} \leq 1 \), \( i = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, |F_j| \) and \( j = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, |F| \), given that \( F = \{F_j\}_{j=1}^{|F|} \) is a set of \(|F|\) training feature vectors or alternatively, the \( M \)-dimensional feature matrix. Each \( F_j \) is labelled by \( y_j \in \{1, -1\} \) with \( y_j = 1 \) and \( y_j = -1 \), which indicates the membership of \( F_j \) in the class 1 and class 2 through Equation 1 [6, 14].

\[
    f(x) = \sum_j a_j y_j K(F', F_j) + b \quad (1)
\]

Where \( a_i \) and \( b \) are obtained by a quadratic algorithm, \( F' \) is the unlabelled webpage and \( F_j \) is the feature vector of a training webpage. The function \( K(F', F_j) \) maps the space of input webpage to higher dimensions, where training webpages in the dataset are learned individually.

### 4 Results and Discussion

#### 4.1 Experimental Setup

A preliminary set of real world webpages, 500 living phishing webpages and 500 valid legitimate webpages were downloaded in 60 days from September to November 2014. Specifically, the phishing pages were downloaded from two publically available sources; the Phish Tank and the Castle Cops archives. The Alexa’s top sites archive was used as the source of legitimate webpages. The collected webpages were different from those of the most targeted financial organizations, homepage, and login functionalities. Experimentally, the SVM classifier was trained four times on three matrices belonging to three feature spaces. The first feature space represented the webpage content feature space. Unlikely, the second features space contained features extracted from the webpage URL. The third feature space contained a combination of the former feature spaces to represent the hybrid feature space. Each feature matrix is a multi-dimensional matrix, where each row represents a feature vector extracted from an
examined webpage. A feature vector contains the values of all the features extracted from an examined webpage and its label appears in the first column. Furthermore, the values of those features are either binary or numeric values. The binary features were computed as the union of their corresponding features, while the numeric features were combined by taking the smallest value of the corresponding features. First, all of the feature matrices were trained and tested using the SVM over the collected dataset. To implement the SVM, a machine learning tool from the Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) was used. Then, performance of the SVM over the collected dataset was evaluated using the newly introduced hybrid features according to the experimental results. The performance represented the percentage of correctly examined webpages against the phishing susceptibility over the total number of webpages included in the dataset.

4.2 Results

To demonstrate the significance of hybrid features proposed in this study, the SVM classification was used to explore feature spaces and some formerly used measures. These measurements included the TP, FP, FN, Precision, Recall, and the F1-measure as well as the AUC values under the ROC curve [23, 32, 33, 35, and 46]. The TP or True Positive indicates the rate of correctly classified phish instances. The FP (False Positive) refers to the rate of wrongly classified legitimate instances as the phishing ones. The FN (False Negative) indicates the wrongly labelled phish instances as legitimate ones [23, 32, 33, and 46]. Results of the TP, the FP and the FN are illustrated in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively. Each of the Precision, Recall and F-measure was computed using the parameters of TP, FP and FN [23, 24, 32, and 33]. The maximal value of precision states the maximal positive webpages that are classified. However, the maximal recall value denotes minimal prediction error. Then, the F-measure was used to harmonically compute the mean of both aforementioned measurements, which denotes the initial phishes indication of the extracted features. Equations 2, 3 and 4 describe these measurements [6-8, 10, 11, 23, 24, 32, and 33]. Fig. 4 illustrates the features evaluation with respect to the above-mentioned measurements using the SVM classifier.

\[
Precision = \frac{|TP|}{|TP|+|FP|} \tag{2}
\]

\[
Recall = \frac{|FP|}{|TP|+|FN|} \tag{3}
\]

\[
F-measure = 2 \times \frac{Precision \times Recall}{Precision + Recall} \tag{4}
\]
On the basis of the classifier’s prediction for each examined webpage in the dataset, the area under the ROC curve (AUC) was set for each feature. Next, each feature was ranked in the form of its weight value and the features were grouped according to the weight values, positive features in weight and negative features in weight, respectively. Then, the features in each group were sorted in a descending order. Calculation of the AUC value is presented in Equation 5 [35, 46] as follows:

\[
AUC = \frac{1}{MN} \sum_{j=1}^{M}(S_j - j)
\]

Where \( S_j \) is the rank of each \( j^{th} \) feature in each group and \( S_j - j \) is the number of positive features before the negative features in weight [35, 46]. The results of the computing area under the ROC curve in terms of the features space and AUC value is illustrated in Fig. 5.

![True Positive Rate](image)

Fig.2: Percentages of TP in terms of the features category.

![Prediction sensitivity](image)

Fig.3: Prediction sensitivity in terms of the category of features space, and percentages of FP and FN.
4.3 Discussion

The aforementioned experimental results and evaluations revealed that based on the used features space and collected dataset, the results of the TP rate had the higher accuracy under the SVM machine learning algorithm as plotted in Figure 2. However, the results plotted in Figure 3 show that they achieved lower sensitivity to the FP and substantially lower FN as compared to other tested features. This is because the investigated features could handle a large dataset with various features belonging to multiple features spaces. On the other hand, the test results plotted in Figure 4 show that the proposed hybrid features performed the best under the SVM classifier based on all the three performance measurements (Precision, Recall and F-measure). Therefore, these can effectively maximize the prediction susceptibility of phishing detective approach against phishing as compared to other previous features. In addition, the statistical results illustrated in Figure 5 reveal that 58 features vary in their susceptibility to predict phishing. For instance, the features F1, F2, F3, F18, F49 and F52 outperform all other with the AUC values of 0.8844, 0.8829, 0.8772, 1.0000, 0.9624 and 0.8226, respectively. However, the features including F9, F11, F15, F51, F53 and F56 perform lower with the AUC values of 0.6391, 0.6428, 0.6362, 0.4537, 0.5621 and 0.2548. This implies that phishing prediction of these features under the SVM classifier is random.

To sum up, the findings show that new phishing features could possibly provide valuable trends of investigation for detecting more sophisticated phishes. This will help in circumventing the phishers’ attempts to bypass the existing phishing detective approaches.
Fig. 5: Area under ROC curve in terms of individual features and their AUC values.
Consequently, almost all of the introduced features are highly expected to be exploited by the phishers owing to their functionalities in modification, imitation, redirection, injection of codes and links to obtain user’s confidential information. These features can be assigned to more than one type of phish. Furthermore, accuracy and sensitivity tests indicate effects of the reduced overlap and increased assignment of hybrid features to more than one phish pattern. However, major issues that should be considered are the computation time and the cost. Even though the used SVM classifier is highly effective, using 58 hybrid features may negatively affect the execution time of extraction, training and testing over large datasets. Further improvement is needed to reduce the dimensionality of the introduced feature space as well as the complexity and the time of prediction over large datasets and for real life applications. Thus, single or multiple use of the aforementioned features are recommended against the sophisticated phishing attacks. Also, the best combination of features should be taken into account by using feature selection techniques to help in improving the overall performance of detection.

5 Conclusions

This work introduced 58 hybrid features for the effective prediction susceptibility on advanced phishing attacks. A supervised machine learning technique and some commonly used performance measurements were used to assess the introduced features through experiments. Two features spaces were explored to extract hybrid features. Then, these features were trained and tested using the SVM classifier to evaluate their prediction susceptibility with respect to their classification performance against the phish webpages over a collected dataset. According to the findings, the proposed hybrid features can contribute to high prediction susceptibility and yield accurate detection results compared to the previously utilized features in the literature. The scope of the present work is limited to introducing new hybrid features and precise assessment of their prediction susceptibilities against some kinds of emerging phishes. Thus, the future work should continually target major improvements aimed at reducing the time and complexity of features processing. Additionally, the detection approach should be improved through techniques such as the machine learning classification for the best prediction susceptibility in real life situations.

References


